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UNITED STATES V. CABRERA
222 F.3D 590 (9TH 2000)

FACTS
At his trial for distribution of crack cocaine, remarks about defendant
Carlos Manuel Cabrera's Cuban ancestry were admitted as evidence.' Cabrera
was convicted in the United States District Court for conspiracy to distribute,
possession with intent to distribute, and distribution of crack-cocaine (crack).2
At trial, police testified that they had learned Cabrera was selling crack and
bought some from him in an undercover operation The police arranged
subsequent purchases of crack from Cabrera, which Detective Brooks recorded
on audio tape.4 During the investigation, police discovered that Cabrera's
supplier was Iran Poch Mulgado (Mulgado).5 At the third meeting with
Cabrera, the police simultaneously arrested him and searched Mulgado' s home
pursuant to a search warrant.6 When the police discovered crack, Mulgado
admitted to the police that he was selling.7
The federal prosecutor charged Cabrera and Mulgado with conspiracy to
distribute a controlled substance,8 several counts of distribution of a controlled
substance, and possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance. 9
Detective Brooks was the prosecution's main witness at trial." Throughout
the joint trial, Detective Brooks repeatedly referred to the defendants' Cuban
origin." The jury convicted both defendants."
Although Detective Brooks made many remarks about Cubans during the
trial, the defendants did not object, but instead chose to challenge the detective
on cross examination.' 3 For example, Detective Brooks testified that the
reason that there was a three-month gap in the investigation between the initial
contact with Cabrera to his actual arrest was that police were "working"
Cubans in the area for other drug-related transactions. 14 Detective Brooks
further testified that, in his experience, crack manufactured and distributed in
round, flat wafers suggested that members of the Cuban community were
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involved. 5 Detective Brooks also stated that he had conducted many drugrelated investigations in an area he called "Naked City,"' 6 a community
densely populated with Cubans.' 7
When the prosecutor asked Detective Brooks why the police served the
search warrant on Mulgado at the same time that the police arrested Cabrera,
he replied that this practice was customary among the North Las Vegas Police
Department when dealing with people who were resident aliens or otherwise
not American citizens.' Detective Brooks stated that many people who were
resident aliens flee the country if they know arrest is imminent. 9 Detective
Brooks stated that he was not being derogatory, but in his experience Cubans
and people from South America should be considered flight risks. 2° Defense
counsel clarified that both Cabrera and Mulgado were resident aliens
employed in Las Vegas. 2'
The jury convicted Cabrera and Mulgado for conspiracy to distribute,
possession with intent to distribute, and distribution of crack, based in part on
the Detective's testimony.22 Cabrera and Mulgado appealed their convictions
to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.'
HOLDING
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a unanimous
decision, held that references to a defendant's racial or ethnic background
violate both Due Process and Equal Protection rights guaranteed under the
Fifth Amendment. 24 Using a plain error standard of review, the court found
the references to the defendants' Cuban ancestry at trial improper and
inadmissible under Federal Rules-of Evidence Rule 403.5 The court also
found that most of the references to Cubans were not relevant under Federal
Rules of Evidence Rules 401 and 402.26 The court reversed the convictions
and remanded for a new trial.27
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ANALYSIS

Writing for the court, Judge Dorothy W. Nelson stated that "[a]ppeals to
racial, ethnic, or religious prejudice during the course of a trial violate a
defendant's Fifth Amendment right to a fair trial."2 The court used the plain
error standard of review in its analysis of this case. 29 The Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure establish two different standards of reviewing evidence.
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 52(a) sets forth the standard for a
court to review a case using a harmless error analysis.30 Appellate courts apply
the harmless error standard of review when a defendant preserves his right to
appeal by objecting to evidence offered during the course of a trial. Under this
standard of review, a conviction will be upheld even if some of the evidence
was improperly admitted, provided that the total evidence of guilt is
overwhelming and the evidence improperly admitted does not substantially
affect the defendant's rights.3
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure Rule 52(b) sets forth the plain error
standard of review.32 Courts use the plain error standard of review when a
defendant fails to object to challengeable evidence offered during the course
of a trial. 33 Admission of evidence that affects a substantial right of the
defendant is considered plain error. Rule 52(b) gives discretion to the
appellate court regarding review, and although the rule suggests review, it is
not mandatory.34 According to the Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 52(b),
this rule simply restates existing law. 35 The admission of such evidence is a
fundamental error and Rule 52(b) is a mechanism that is used to avoid a
36
procedural defect in a case and to protect the rights of defendants.
In United States v. Olano, 37 the Supreme Court established a three-prong
limitation on an appellate court's authority to review a case for plain error

28. Id. at 594.
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30. Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states: "Any error, defect, irregularity or
variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be disregarded." FED. R. CRIM. P. 52(a).
31. See id.
32. Rule 52(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure states: "Plain errors or defects affecting
substantial rights may be noticed although they were not brought to the attention of the court." FnD. R.
CRIM. P. 52(b).
33. See id.
34. See id.
35.
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39
under Rule 52(b). 38 The first limitation is that there must be an "error.
Olano explained that an error is a "deviation from a legal rule, unless the
rule has been waived." 40 The second limitation is that the error in question
must be plain. 41 The court noted that "[p]lain error is 'clear' or 'obvious'
[error] that affect[s] the defendant's substantial rights and that "seriously
affects the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial
proceedings."" The third limitation is that the error must actually affect the
substantial rights of a defendant. 43 Under Rule 52(b), the defendant has the
burden of proving that the error is prejudicial."
Because neither defendant objected to the prejudicial testimony at trial, the
court reviewed the evidence for plain error in accordance with Rule 52(b).
The court applied its ruling to both defendants, although only Mulgado filed
an appeal, because the testimony affected both equally. 45 The court also
recognized that reversing one conviction and upholding another would be
fundamentally unfair, since both convictions were the result of a joint trial
with the same error.4 Lastly, until the court decided Bains v. Cambra,4 7 which
was after the parties here filed briefs, no Ninth Circuit case had dealt with this
issue. 48 The Ninth Circuit found that the testimony admitted by the district
court was "'plain error' and therefore reversal [was] 'necessary to prevent a
miscarriage of justice."' 49
In Bains, the Ninth Circuit held that the prosecutor committed harmless
error in soliciting trial testimony about the Sikh religion to generalize that "all
Sikh persons (and thus [defendant] by extension) are irresistibly predisposed
to violence when a family member has been dishonored."5 ° Although the
Ninth Circuit upheld the convictions in Bains, the court explained that
typically "references to racial, ethnic or religious groups are not only improper
and prejudicial but also reversible error." 5' However, because the review in

38. See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725,732 (1993) (holding presence of alternate jurors during

jury deliberations in criminal case is not plain error under Rule 52(b) of Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure).
39. Olano, 507 U.S. at 733.

40. 507 U.S. at 732-33.
41. Id. at 734.
42. Cabrera,222 F.3d at 595-96 (quoting United States v. Vences, 169 F.3d 611, 613 (9th Cir.
1999)).
43. Olano, 507 U.S. at 734.
44. 507 U.S. at 734.
45. Cabrera, 222 F.3d at 596 n.3.
46. 222 F.3d at 596 n.3 (citing United States v. Olano, 934 F.2d 1425, 1439 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd
on other grounds, 507 U.S. 725 (1993)).
47. Bains v. Cambra, 204 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2000).
48. Cabrera,222 F.3d 596 n.3.
49. 222 F.3d at 596 n.3. (citations omitted).
50. Id. at 594 (quoting Bains, 204 F.3d at 975)(emphasis in original).
51. 222 F.3d at 594.
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Bains was a habeas review of a state court decision, and not a federal court
decision as in this case, the court reviewed the admission of racial remarks
under the state's harmless error standard of review and upheld the conviction.5 2
Also, the facts are distinguishable because in Bains the comments were made
in closing arguments and not in testimony.53
In Cabrera,applying the plain error standard of review, the court held that
references to a defendant's racial or ethnic background violate both Due
Process and Equal Protection rights guaranteed under the Fifth Amendment. 4
In this case, the court followed the Eighth Circuit decision in United States v.
Vue,55 which held that testimony that Hmong" people have a tendency to
smuggle opium into St. Paul and Minneapolis was reversible error under the
plain error standard.57 Although the court in Vue found sufficient evidence to
support the conviction, it nonetheless reversed the verdict because stereotypes
about the Hmong people were admitted at trial,58 violating both the Due
Process and Equal Protection guarantees of the Fifth Amendment.59 The
Eighth Circuit explained that bringing the issue of race or ethnic background
into the trial was a clear invitation to the jury to use race and ethnicity in
determining guilt.'
In considering Cabrera' s claim, the court gleaned additional guidance from
United States v. Cruz.6 In that case, the Second Circuit applied the plain error
standard of review and held that the star witness's references to the defendant
as "the Dominican" and testimony describing a New York City neighborhood
where drug transactions took place as having "a very high Hispanic
population" were reversible error.62 The Second Circuit said the "injection of
a defendant's ethnicity into a trial as evidence of criminal behavior is selfevidently improper and prejudicial for reasons that need no elaboration here." ' 3
Finally, the court noted the D.C. Circuit's decision in United States v. Doe."
In Doe, the court found reversible error where the bulk of evidence
presented at trial was testimony and closing arguments about Jamaicans taking
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over the crack trade in Washington. 65 A police detective provided the majority
of the testimony and gave a detailed description of the Jamaican drug trade
locally." Attorneys for the government explained that the testimony was only
about Jamaican drug dealers, not all Jamaicans, and therefore insisted that the
court consider the appeal only as an issue of juror bias. 7 The D.C. Circuit
refused to accept the explanation and stated, "It is much too late in the day to
treat lightly the risk that racial bias may influence a jury's verdict in a criminal
case." 68 The D.C. Circuit further held that appeals to race or ancestry are
"odious" and "suspect" and endanger the fairness that is required in a trial.69
"[R]acial fairness of the trial," the Doe court found, "is an indispensable
7
ingredient of due process and racial equality a hallmark of justice."
II. Standards of Admissibility
In deciding whether the evidence offered in the district court was relevant
and admissible, the court reviewed Rules 401 and 402, the applicable Federal
Rules of Evidence.7 Under Rule 402, "[elvidence which is not relevant is not
admissible. 7 2 Rule 401 defines "relevant evidence" as that which has "any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence."73 Rule 403 provides, in part, that "[a]lthough relevant,
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
'
the danger of unfair prejudice."74
The court found that under Rules 401 and 402, the remarks by Detective
Brooks were not relevant. 75 Though highlighting the ethnicity of the other
drug dealers also under investigation was ostensibly introduced to explain the
three-month gap in the detectives' investigation,76 the court held it only led the
jury to believe that because the other drug dealers under investigation were
Cuban, the Cuban defendants must also be drug dealers.77 In addition, the
court found that the comments about the proliferation of Cuban drug dealers
65.
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were similar to the comments about Jamaicans taking over Washington, D.C.
in Doe. 8 The court stated that because the evidence was not relevant, it was
not admissible, and as such constituted plain error.7 9
Although the court decided that most of the comments made by the police
officers relating to the defendants' Cuban origin were not relevant, the court
found that the references to packaging could be relevant. Applying Rule 403,
the court examined the testimony that Cubans were usually the only persons
who manufactured and distributed crack in round, flat wafers.' The court
decided that the information, though arguably probative, was prejudicial
because it lent itself to the misconception that Cubans were responsible for the
crack epidemic in the city.8' Even though the packaging could be
demonstrative of Cabrera and Mulgado's expertise as drug dealers, the court
stated it was unnecessary to tie that fact together with the defendants' national
origin. 2 The court also found that the reference to Cubans being flight risks
served only to reinforce the idea that foreign drug dealers were creating a drug
epidemic. 3 Therefore, the court found that under Rules 401, 402, and 403,
Aall of Officer 4Brooks's refe ences to Cuban drug habits were improper and
8'
inadmissible.
CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit sets forth a bright line on the admission of evidence
regarding racial, ethnic or religious backgrounds of defendants in a criminal
trial. If courts allow police officers and other witnesses to make stereotypical
statements about racial and ethnic groups just to get a conviction, then the
essential fairness of a criminal trial is at risk. It is not acceptable under the
Constitution to allow people to be tried and convicted merely because they are
of a certain racial, ethnic or religious group. The court recognized that the
evidence admitted in this case affected the substantial rights of the defendants.
As a result, the case was reviewed using the plain error standard of review
proscribed in Rule 52(b).
This decision has an important impact on racial and ethnic groups by
recognizing the existence of stereotypes and forbidding their use in court. The
decision by the court establishes a prohibition on the use of stereotypes to
78. Id.
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generalize specific characteristics to defendants. Under this ruling, attorneys
must give a jury facts to decide a case and not emotion.
Summary and Analysis Prepared by:
Loren Weiss

